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THE COFFEE EXCHANGE DEBACLE: HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED
FOR FURTHER REGULATION OF FUTURES TRADING THROUGH
THE SHERMAN AND COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACTS*
FOR every commodity there exists a cash or physical market on which con-
tracts for current or future delivery are consummated.' Some commodities
also have a futures market on which commitments for future delivery are madc.
2
But while dealers on the cash market generally contemplate actual delivery,
traders on the futures market usually settle their contract by a money payment
representing the difference between the market price at the time of contract
and the price at the time of liquidation.3
*New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 25,364 (F.T.C,
1955) (initial consent order by hearing examiner).
1. A physical, cash or spot market is any place where people meet and exchange
their goods. For the development of our modern complex market organization, see BAI'U
& SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FuyTuREs TRADING 1-13, 127-29 (1949) (herein-
after cited as BAER & SAXON).
2. For list of commodities which are traded on the futures market, see CoMtotni-v
YEaR BOOK 48 (1954).
3. See BAER & SAXON 127-29; CoMM DITv EXCHANGE, INC. 7-8 (1939) (a pamphlet
published by Commodity Exchange, Inc., describing its functions and activities). The
futures contract is a standard contract form with stereotyped conditions such as unit of
trading, grade and type of commodity, and conditions of delivery. Units of trading are
the quantity multiples in which trading can be done. For example, wheat and corn are
traded in 5000 bu. lots. Most futures contracts allow delivery of several grades or types
of the commodity. However, discounts and premiums are established to allow for price
differentials between grades or types. BAER & SAXON C. VII; HOFFMAN, Ft'TrM.
TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKETS C. VI (1932). All futures contracts
provide for delivery, although settlement by delivery is rare. See note 5 infra. Without an
"intent to deliver," futures contracts have been held void as wagering agreements. See
Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188 (1933) (Mo.); Chickasha Cotton Oil Co,
v. Chapman, 4 F.2d 319, cert. denied, 268 U.S. 700 (1925) (Okla.). But cf. Board of
Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905). For the historical background
and detailed discussion of the "intent to deliver" test of state laws, see Irwin, Legal
Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REv. 155 (1937) ; Taylor, Trading in Commodity
Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YAL L.J. 63 (1933) ; Legis. Note, 45 HAIry
L. REv. 912, 917 n.26 (1932); HoFPmAN, op. cit. supra, at 359-60.
A typical transaction on the futures market would follow this pattern. A instructs
his broker in January to buy 5000 bu. of wheat for delivery in March at $2.32 a bu. A's
broker makes the offer on the exchange. B's broker has instructions to sell 5000 bu. of
wheat for delivery in March. B's broker accepts A's broker's offer. To facilitate trading,
the clearing house at this point assumes the position of the opposite party to both A &B.
Therefore, actually A has contracted to buy 5000 bu. of wheat from the exchange for
March delivery and B has contracted to sell 5000 bu. of wheat to the exchange. Assume
that in February the price of March wheat futures contracts has advanced to $2.42 a bu.
A decides to settle his contract. In order to do so, he must engage in an offsetting
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Trading in futures contracts on the organized exchanges 4 is primarily en-
gaged in by speculators and hedgers. 5 Hedging is the practice of protecting
a commitment on the cash market from adverse price fluctuation by entering
into an offsetting transaction on the futures market. For example, a grain
dealer who has made a contract in January to receive delivery of wheat in
June could hedge by simultaneously committing himself on the futures market
to deliver the same quantity of wheat in June.6 Any profit or loss from price
fluctuation on the cash market by delivery date would be offset by an opposite
profit or loss on the futures contract, since the price trends on the cash
market tend to follow the trends on the futures market.7 This price corre-
lation exists because dealers in futures are commonly regarded as trading on
the basis of expert analyses of all relevant economic data.8
transaction. A, therefore, contracts to sell 5000 bu. of March wheat on the futures
market to C. The clearing house, seeing that this transaction places A in the Plsition
of having contracted both to buy and to sell 5000 bu. of wheat for March delivery, cancels
the two contracts. However, since A contracted to buy the wheat for 10. per bu.
lower than he agreed to sell, the clearing house pays him $500.00. The clearing house
can neither gain nor lose by assuming the opposite position to both parties of every
contract because every contract to buy is offset by a contract to sell. CommoDniv Excn:.Ge,
Ixc. 9-12 (1954) ; B A & SAxoN 164-96.
Enforcement of futures contracts is insured by the clearing house requiring each
member to deposit a sum called a "margin" for each contract he trades. Id. at 171-76.
4. The organized commodity exchanges are incorporated non-profit associatiuns on
which all futures trading is done. The exchange facilitates trading by establishing rules,
settling disputes between members, and generally providing the mechanism which makes
trading possible. Ba & SAXON c. VIII. The exchanges maintain, as an adjunct, clearing
houses which do the necessary record keeping for all futures transactions. Furthermore,
the clearing house not only offsets contracts of its members but also guarantees, perform-
ance. BAER & SAXON c. IX.
5. Trading on the exchange is usually unsatisfactory as a method of acquiring a
specific grade or type of the commodity, since contracts can often be answered vith
several grades and types. BAER & SAXON 137.
6. The producer hedges by doing the exact opposite of the dealer. Since the producer
is committed on the cash market to sell to the dealer, he would hedge by agreeing to take
delivery on the futures market of the same commodity in the same quantity and at the
same time as his commitment on the cash market. BAEn & SAx':& ; cc. XI-XII; Hor.F~ n,
HEDGING iY DEALING IN GRAIN Furuans (1925).
7. See BAER & SAXON 206; HOFFUMAN, FuTruR TRADING UPON OrIGAMzr D CODM-
MOurY MAREr:rs 254-58 (1932). The price correlation between the cash and futures
market is only a general tendency. Temporary dislocations are inevitable in price move-
ment. Therefore, hedging is not designed as perfect insurance but only to prevent major
losses. See BAER & SAXON 206.
8. HoF-asAir, op. cit. supra note 7, at 260, 276; BAER & SAXo.N 39-40. The theory
that speculative trading reflects expertise is not born out by an analysis of the occupa-
tional background and resources of the average speculator. Comment, 60 YALE L.. M2,
829-30 (1951). However, perhaps the notion that speculation is based un e.iperthe
refers primarily to the quality of trading information available to speculators. Ste BAvlt
& SAXON 98-102.
The price correlation between futures and cash markets has also been attributed to
the threat of actual delivery forcing the futures traders to keep the price on the futures
market related to the price on the cash market. See HOFFMAN., op. cit. supra note 7, at
256-57.
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In contrast to the hedger, who does not care whether the price rises or
falls, the speculator gambles that prices will fluctuate in his favor.9 The hedger
is able to shift his risk because of speculators who are willing to assume the
opposite market position.' 0 Trading by speculators also furnishes the economy
with a barometer of anticipated supply and demand, thereby providing a cal-
culated prediction of price for the coming year."' This index provides guidance
for decisions as to inventory policy, production, and speculation, 12 just as the
prices set by traders on the securities exchanges influence investment and
speculation in securities. 13 Thus speculation in commodities futures helps
to direct the allocation of resources in accord with current estimates of future
profitability. 1
4
If the price of futures is susceptible to manipulation by speculators, the
useful functions of futures trading may be frustrated. Manipulation may
take many forms.15 For example, an exchange limitation may be placed on
the grade or type of commodity to be traded.' 0 This diminishes the utility of
9. The most common type of speculation is called open speculation, which consists of
either buying or selling on the futures market, and then cancelling out by an offsetting
transaction after the anticipated price fluctuation has taken place. Open speculators cau
be divided into two classes. First, there are the persons who, on the basis of estimates
of the factors affecting future prices, determine that the price will move in a certain
direction. The second type is the price movement speculator or "scalper" who buys when
prices are advancing and sells when prices are declining. To be successful, the price
movement speculator has to change his position as fast as the price reverses, for his
speculation is not based on any underlying theory of eventual price trends. A second type
of speculation is spreading or arbitraging. When the price spread for commodities on
two different markets is out of alignment, the arbitrageur simultaneously buys on the
cheaper market and sells on the higher priced market, thus making a profit from the
eventual return of the price spread to normal. See HOFFMAN, Fu'ruo TRADING UPON
THE ORGANIZED COMMODITY ExCHANGES 135-42 (1932) ; Harris. Arbilraging in Grain,
155 ANNALS 74 (1931) ; Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on
Organized Exchanges, 27 Am. EcoN. RE V. 267 (1937).
10. Since everyone dealing on the physical market does not hedge his commitments,
the speculators provide a liquid commodity market on which hedging is always possible.
Hedging is not universal because: 1. Some dealers would rather speculate than hedge.
2. Some commodities are unsuitable for hedging. 3. One party might hedge a substantial
commitment representing many contracts, while the opposite parties will not hedge their
individual smaller contracts. Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 825 11.14 (1951).
11. BAER & SAXON 39-44. If the futures market did not exist, a future price would
be created for every commodity through the process of contracting for future delivery on
the cash market. The futures market gives the economy a world-wide, easily accessible
future price index based on the judgment of the speculator. Ibid. This specialization of
function presumably benefits the economy. However, if the bulk of the speculators are
following price rather than anticipating it, see note 9 supra, the futures market will not
serve as an accurate barometer. See Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assunnplion in the
Trading on Organized Exchanges, 27 Am. EcoN. REv. 267-71 (1937).
12. See HicKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL 124-27, 138-39 (1939); note 9 supra.
13. See I KEYNES, MONEY 248-54 (1930).
14. Speculation has also been credited with stabilizing prices. BAER & SAXON 69-72.
But see Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 828-30 (1951).
15. Three types of manipulation are: "corners" and "squeezes"; "bear raids" and
"shake outs"; and buying or selling in a manner calculated to produce maximum affect
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the exchange for hedging, since the hedger must be be able to obtain a futures
contract for a grade or type of commodity similar to his commitment on the
cash market. 17 Any type of manipulation might cause prices which are unre-
lated for a short time to estimated future supply and demand.' 8 Because the
price trend on the cash market is related to the price trend on the futures
market,' 9 manipulation of futures prices might cause the general public
to pay prices for the processed commodity not warranted by supply and de-
mand.20 Furthermore, fluctuation caused by manipulation is likely to make
hedging impracticable. Effective hedging is impossible if at the date of de-
livery on the cash market contract, the price change on that market is not
substantially proportionate to the price fluctuation on the futures market. -1
Although the cash market price normally lags somewhat behind futures
prices, 22 this tendency is often accentuated by unnatural price movement of
the futures market.23 Moreover, in a period of rapid fluctuation the futures
on prices, frequently in a concentrated fashion and relatively large lots. Irwin, The Nature
of Risk Assumption in the Trading on Organized Exchages, 27 AM. EcoN; Rev. 267
(1937). A corner is a condition where one or more speculators have contracted to
take delivery of so much of the supply that outstanding contracts to make delivery cannot
be fulfilled except at prices which the operators of the corner dictate. Successful corners
require the speculators to hold until delivery time, of course, for it will be when delivery
time approaches that the "short" positions realize that they can not cover their contracts.
A partial corner is called a squeeze. Theoretically, a squeeze requires the "long" positions
to hold until delivery time. However in practice squeezes often cause the price to rise
before delivery date simply because of the prospect of short supply at delivery time.
Squeezes may be caused by many other factors, such as crop failures, droughts, and misin-
formation on supplies available for delivery. HoFFmA., FurTumE TRAINc Upo:. TuE
ORGANIZED CommoDrr A MAxumr 309-18 (1932); BAER & SAXOz 82-85 (1949). Bear
raids or shakeouts occur when the "short" positions, those contracting to make delivery,
organize to force prices of certain contracts down. They sell lots of the same contracts
which the "longs" are holding in substantial lots. See Dic & EIEMrA., TUE STocK
MfRxxr 460 (1941). Concentrated buying or selling is really a necessary corollary of
all manipulation.
16. HomFIA , op. cit. supra note 15, at 277-78.
17. Id. at 279.
18. Unlike the speculator who tries to anticipate price fluctuations by predicting
supply and demand, the manipulator attempts to induce such fluctuations. BArq & SAXON
19. See note 7 supra.
20. See discussion of the 1954 rise in coffee prices in notes 25-3S infra and accompany-
ing text
21. If the price change is not substantially proportionate, the profit or loss on the
futures contract will not offset the profit or loss on the cash contract. See notes 5-7
supra and accompanying text; BAER & SAXON 205-06; HoFF=N, HmDiGG BY DLUAJN-G
Im GRIN FuTuRzs 61-93 (1925).
22. This lag exists because the organized exchanges with their extensive communica-
tion system receive information affecting future prices much more rapidly titan the cash
market. See HOFF-MAN, Firrunz TRADING UPON ORGANIZFD CoMMoDITY MxRs 259-60
(1932).
23. This occurs because buyers on the cash market lose faith in the prevailing futures
prices. Id. at 274.
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price for a short time might be completely unrelated to the cash price.-'
Because of either condition, a price irrelation may exist at the critical delivery
date.
The need for effective regulation of futures trading is illustrated by the rise
in coffee prices during the early months of 1954. Unlike trading in many
commodities, trading in coffee futures is not regulated by the Commodities
Exchange Act.25 During the period of price rise, Exchange rules limited
futures trading in practice to an "S" contract.26 According to the FTC, this
contract allowed trading only in a type of coffee representing less than' ten
percent of this country's coffee imports.2 7 From December 1953 to April 1954,
24. See HOFFM AN, HEDGING BY DEALING IN GRAIN FUTURES 91 (1925). The FTC
charted prices of one type of coffee on the cash and futures markets for a seventeen year
span. The futures price during periods of rapid movement in 1948, 1949, and 1950 was
sometimes totally unrelated to the cash price. See FTC, EcoNomIc REPORT OF THE IN-
VESTIGATION OF THE COFFEE PRIcEs 377 (1954), (hereinafter cited as FTC RE'oRT).
25. 42 STAT. 998-1003 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1-17a (1952). Organized futures
trading in the following commodities is regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act:
wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter,
eggs, Irish potatoes, wool tops, wool, fats and oils, cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts,
soybeans, and soybean meal. However, the following commodities, extensively traded
on the futures markets, are not regulated under the Act: burlap, cocoa, coffee, copper,
hides, lead, onions, rubber, silk, sugar, tin, and zinc. See ColMooITY YEAR BOOK (1954).
For the details of commodity regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act, see note
66-73 infra and accompanying text. Trading in coffee futures is conducted exclusively on
the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc. For the history and operation of this
Exchange, see FTC REPORT 282-304.
26. FTC REPORT 346-51. For the history and analysis of the contracts traded on the
New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, see id. at 317-87. The "S" contract, which only
allowed delivery of coffee from the port of Santos, Brazil, was changed in 1952 to an,"S"
(new) contract which allows alternate delivery of coffee shipped from three other ports
in Brazil. However, the Brazilian Government since 1951 has controlled the exporting Of
coffee by limiting movement from the three alternative ports until a certain quota of
coffee from Santos has been exported. Furthermore, the "S" (new) contract allows
deliveries in coffee from the other three Brazilian ports at fixed discounts to Santos
coffee. Since the value of coffee from the other ports is often closer to Santos than the
discount would indicate, sellers will not deliver from these alternative sources. Thus, the
control of marketing of coffee by the Brazilian Government and the price differential
system of the "S" (new) contract seems to have nullified any broadening effect which
the change may have had. Id. at 349-68. A second universal contract can also be traded
at present. However, this "U" contract has not been traded since 1951 because it allows
delivery of whatever coffee is available at lowest market values. Id. 347-49. The "U"
contract was created by the Exchange as the result of pressure from the Gillette sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Id. at 280.
27. The FTC arrived at this figure through the following calculations: 50% of all
coffee imported into the United States is from Brazil; 50% of Brazilian coffee comes
from Santos; 40% of Brazilian coffee imported in the United States enters through the
port of New York. The only coffee which is deliverable on futures contracts is coffee
in New York City. FTC REPORT xxxvii. The accuracy of the "less than 10%" figure
depends on the following assumptions: first, that the Brazilian government controls, see
note 26 supra, limit importation to Santos coffee; second, that some of the imported




the price of coffee futures rose approximately sL-ty percent, reflected in a
corresponding price rise on the cash market.28 This rapid increase was largely
the result of organized groups of traders assuming substantial "long" positions
by contracting to take future delivery.20 The Exchange's lack of realistic
limits on speculative buying made such substantial positions possible. 0
One reason for the concentrated buying was the reported frost damage to
the Brazilian crop.3 ' But the FTC estimates that the realized shortage would
have justified a price rise of from only fifteen to twenty-five percent.Y" Specu-
lators may also have been attempting some market manipulation. If so, they
were aided by the restrictive "S" contract. Concentrated buying on a "thin"
futures market creates the possibility that at delivery time the supply will be
insufficient to meet the demands of the buyers. As the prospect of short
supply becomes evident, the price rises.33 This price movement occurs on
the futures market even though delivery is not common, since it is always
possible that delivery may be demanded.34 The larger the market base, how-
ever, the larger the position required to affect the price.35 A thin market also
New York; third, that coffee shipped to other ports in the United States is not then
reshipped to New York.
28. Id. at xv.
29. Id. at XL-NLu. The FTC analyzed the degree of concentration of accounts on
the Coffee Exchange during the period of Dec. 1953 through Feb. 1954. The study indi-
cated that "net long accounts accounting for an average of 1.9% of the total number of
accounts in the market held an average net long position amounting to 35.75 of the
open interest . . . ." Id. at 399.
For the effect of concentrated buying of futures markets, see note 15 supra.
30. Id. at XLV.
31. Id. at xv
32. Id. at x-. To determine the price increase which will result from a decrease in
supply, three factors must be calculated: the supply, the demand, and the elasticity of
demand. The supply of coffee is very difficult to calculate, for the carryover stock has to
be determined. This data is almost impossible to obtain. See id. at 1. The FTC used
total world production for their supply figure. Such production was rising during this
period despite the shortage in Brazil. See id. at 1-32, 82. The FTC calculated demand
by projecting past consumption trends. Consumption has fallen off somewhat in the last
few years, perhaps due to the low rate of increase of the coffee consuming ropulation and
the growing use of instant coffee, coffee stretchers, and coffee substitutes. Set- id. at 33-56.
The FTC admits that its consumption figures must be regarded as "rough approxima-
tions." Id. at 33. The elasticity of demand is measured by the rate the demand decreases
as the price increases. The FTC found that the elasticity of demand for coffee was less
than that for luxury items but more than that for staples like potatoes or corn. Id. at
39-40. However, the accuracy of the estimate of elasticity of demand depends on elements
often incapable of measurement, such as change in general prosperity, taste, and habits.
See MARSHALL, PINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 102-16 (Sth ed. 1938).
33. See note 15 supra.
34. See HOFFMAN, Fu'TLE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARlKETS 306
(1932).
35. On a market with a broad trading base such as the corn or wheat market,
squeezes and corners are more difficult because the potential deliverable supply is large.
See HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 34, c. XVI.
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promotes instability by discouraging hedging.80 Since hedgers are not con-
cerned with which way the price moves,3 7 if the market is suitable for hedging,
the effect of concentrated buying or selling will be partially offset by hedgers
assuming opposite positions.38
Existing state laws do not provide effective control of those commodities
unregulated by the Commodities Exchange Act. Most state laws focus
primarily upon such practices as "bucket-shopping"' 0 and trading in futures
contracts which are made with no intent to deliver.40 However, the typical
state law does not impose limits on speculative buying and selling.41 Moreover,
state laws generally affect the individual traders, providing only minimal
control of the overall exchange operation. 42 A few states have rudimentary
systems of exchange regulation ;43 but the control provided is not sufficient to
prevent such practices as the restrictive contract on the Coffee Exchange. 44
The antitrust laws provide another means of regulating commodity ex-
changes. The Government has never won an antitrust case against a futures
exchange;45 nevertheless there is no doubt that the exchanges are subject to
the antitrust laws.46 After an extensive investigation, the FTC charged the
36. For the effect of a narrow trading base on hedging, see text at note 17, supra.
If the "S" contract had been used to hedge one important type of coffee over a period of
fifteen years, and if the contracts each year had been bought at the highest price and sold
at the lowest price, losses would still have been 72% of losses without hedging. FTC
REPORT 378. For the roasters' and importers' opinion of the Coffee Exchange's suitability
for hedging, see id. at 313-15.
37. See text following note 8 .supra.
38. See HOFFMAN, HEDGING By DEALING IN GRAIN FUTURES 91 (1925).
39. All of the many types of "bucketshopping" are based on the broker failing to
execute the customer's order on the exchange. For example, the broker may simply
offset buying customers against selling customers, thus collecting his commissions without
the expense of executing the order. "Bucketshopping" is forbidden for the commodities
regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act 49 STAT. 1493 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S,C.
6b(D) (1952). For state laws forbidding "bucketshopping," see Legis. Note, 45 HADty. L.
REV. 912, 917 n.26 (1932). See generally HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED
COMMODITY MARKETS 357-59 (1932).
40. See note 3 supra.
41. See, e.g., laws on futures trading in the following states: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
8614-16 (1949) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 328 (1935), c. 114, § 194b (1954) ; KAN. GI:N.
STAT. §§ 50.121-130 (1949); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 137 §§ 4-7 (1949) ; MIcii. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28.321-.325, 28.543-.545 (1935) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.01-.06, 614.15-17, 623.21-.24
(West 1947) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 563.450-.590 (Vernon 1949) ; N.Y. AGR. ANd MARat~r
LAW § 16(21); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 390-94.
42. See note 41 siupra.
43. See, e.g., ILL ANN. STAT. c. 114 § 194b (1945) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § .568
(1938).
44. No state laws require approval of all trading contracts. For examples of typical
state laws, see note 41 supra. However, exchanges' rules are subject to scrutiny of state
antitrust laws. See State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1907).
45. See BAER & SAXON 270.
46. Courts have scrutinized rules and practices of futures exchanges to determine
whether they violated the provisions of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ; United States v. New York Coffee and
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Coffee Exchange with violating section five of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,47 which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices." 48 Because a violation of section one of the Sherman
Act is a violation of section five of the FTC ActP4 the FTC was able to couch
its complaint in language describing a section one violation. The complaint
focused upon the "S" contract, characterizing it as an unreasonable restraint
of trade.50 Rather than go to trial, the Exchange entered into a consent decree
which permits futures trading in approximately seventy percent of the world
coffee crop.51
This consent decree may influence other futures exchanges to maintain
relatively open markets. If so, the decree will discourage at least one manipu-
lative practice probably violative of the Sherman Act. For if the Coffee Ex-
change case had proceeded to trial, the court might have held that the Ex-
change and its members combined or conspired unreasonably to restrain trade
by agreeing to use the "S" contract. In Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States,5 2  the Supreme Court upheld an exchange regulation which
Sugar Exchange, 263 U.S. 611 (1924); Cargill, Inc. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 164
F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 880 (1948) ; Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
47. Complaint of the FTC, In the Matter of New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange,
Inc., Docket No. 6235, Oct. 7, 1954.
48. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
49. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 691 (194) ; Fashion Originators' Guild,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. FTC, 159 F2d 940 (6th
Cir. 1947).
Section one provides: "Every contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is ...
illegal." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1 (1952).
Section five of the FTC Act was passed not only to supplement the Sherman Act, but
to provide broader power over unfair business practice. FTC v. Cement Institute, supra,
at 692; FTC i% Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934); United States v. Beechnut
Packing Co. 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
A restraint of trade to be illegal under the Sherman Act must be unreasonable.
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Sugar
Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
50. The complaint states inter alia that the "purpose and effect" of the "S" contract
was and is "to restrict and restrain unduly trading by respondent members . . . ; to
prevent the trading by respondent members... to hinder and restrain competition between
and among respondent members ... ." Complaint of the FTC, In the matter of New
York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc., Docket No. 6235, Oct. 7, 1954.
51. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, 3 CCH TA&DE REG. REP. I 25,364 (F.T.C.
1955) (initial consent order by hearing examiner). The Coffee Exchange has lpropused
the use of two contracts to broaden the market base in compliance with the cvnsent decree:
the "B" contract, which will allow deliveries from the same four Brazilian ports as the
"S" contract, and the "M" contract, which will permit deliveries of coffee primarily from
Colombia, Mexico, Salvador, and Guatemala. The consent decree forbids discounts and
premiums which would tend to exclude delivery of alternative types of coffee. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 1955, p. 33, col. 1; and see note 26 mipra.
52. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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expanded trading on the exchange.53  The Court implied that
the regulation would have been invalid if it had restricted trading."4 Thus,
the case seems to impose upon exchanges the duty to keep a reasonably open
market. The Coffee Exchange's restriction of market base and the conse-
quent curtailment of competition from hedgers facilitated and invited manipula-
tion. 6 Moreover, even without manipulative buying, the effect of substantial
purchasing on a restricted futures market may be to raise the price on
the cash market to a level unrelated to actual supply and demand.5T Because
of the correlation of price movements on the futures and cash markets,"a
last year's rapid price movement on the Exchange injured not only some
53. The Court declared that all regulations and agreements restrain trade, but that
does not make them illegal. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918). The Court stated: "the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. at 238. The Court found that
the rule was reasonable because it brought additional trading onto an organized market.
Id. at 240.
54. The Court declared that the rule was reasonable because it did not "materially
affect the total volume of grain coming to Chicago. But within the narrow limits of its
operation the rule helped to improve market conditions . . . ." Id. at 240. The implication
is that if the restriction had affected adversely the total volume of grain coming to
Chicago it might have been unreasonable.
55. This is not only a logical inference from the case but a sound rule, for restriction
of a futures market causes the very evils the Sherman Act was designed to combat. See
note 57 infra.
56. This should be the proper test for a Sherman Act restraint by an exchange
because of the economics of exchange operations. See note 57 infra. However, insofar
as the Coffee Exchange's restrictive agreement diminished competition by the hedger,
some analogy can be made to market sharing agreements, United States v. Addyston
Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) ; combinations to control the supply of a
commodity, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; and agree-
ments to foreclose competition, Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
57. The effect of concentrated buying on futures prices may at first blush seem
to stimulate competition. What more competitive situation could be hoped for than the
feverish bidding by "shorts" attempting to cover themselves in a squeeze on the futures
market. The short positions will either be bidding on the cash market to obtain the
commodity to deliver on their contract or will be bidding on the futures market for long
positions to cover their short position. The perpetrator of a corner, when prosecuted for
a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, successfully made the argument before a circuit
court that he had aided competition rather than hindered it. United States v. Patten, 187
Fed. 664 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), rev'd, 226 U.S. 525 (1913). But the Supreme Court in
reversing the circuit court chose to look at the effects of artificially stimulated competi-
tion. The Court stated, "it well may be that running a corner tends for a time to stimulate
competition; but this does not prevent it from being a forbidden restraint, for it also
operates to thwart the usual operation of the laws of supply and demand, to withdraw
the commodity from the normal current of trade, to enhance the price artificially, to
hamper users and consumers in satisfying their needs, and to produce practically the
same evils as does the suppression of competition." United States v. Patten, 226 U.S.
525, 542 (1913).
58. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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speculators but also the general publicYr9 The Exchange's restrictive agree-
ment seems to have been unreasonable because of the apparent absence of
any important purpose for it beyond curtailing trading.S° The contract restric-
tion could also have been viewed as a Sherman Act violation simply because it
foreclosed many traders from using the market as an effective hedging
medium.6 ' These traders were at a competitive disadvantage as against
traders who could utilize the Exchange for hedging. 2 This exclusion is
analogous to a refusal to sell a commodity or service valuable for the com-
petitive success of the potential customer. Such refusals have fallen under
the ban of the Sherman Act.6 3
Despite their applicability to the exchanges, the antitrust laws probably do
not provide adequate regulation of futures trading. Government action after
an artificially induced price increase insures against the defendant's engaging
in the same practices 04 and discourages others from similar violations. How-
ever, it does not prevent costily public injury during the period of abnormal
prices,65 nor does it prevent other deleterious practices. The courts may cor-
rect a certain abuse on a specific exchange through the antitrust laws. But
courts are not administrative bodies and cannot provide their type of day
to day regulation.
Effective futures trading regulation could probably be accomplished by
59. Retail coffee prices rose from $.91 to $1.18 (popular brands $1.32). FTC Rmirr
XV.
60. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911).
61. See HoF-FAN-, Furrum TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY 1ARrETs 279
(1932).
62. Id. at 379-81.
63. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v. New England Fish
Exchange, 258 Fed. 732 (D.C. Mass. 1919); United States v. Providence Fruit and
Produce Building, Inc., 1954 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) f 67872 (D.R.I.
1954). All these cases seem to involve a more positive intent to injure certain competitors
than is apparant in the Coffee Exchange situation. The analogy lies in the common effect
of putting potential customers at a competitive disadvantage.
64. The Sherman Act gives courts the power to enjoin violations. 26 STAT. 209
(1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1952). This power was exercised, for example, in
United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 63 F. Supp. 229 (W.D.N.Y. 1945).
65. Anyone injured in his business or property by practices in violation uf the
Sherman Act may sue for treble damages. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
Roasters or retailers who suffered losses from the rise hi coffee prices might successfully
sue the Exchange if the Exchange is held to have violated the Sherman Act. See Thonisen
v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (shippers sued ocean carriers). It is extremely doubtful
if anyone not engaged in a commercial enterprise, i.e., the consumer, could sue under § 15.
See Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F. Supp. 93, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (dictum).
66. 42 STAT. 998-1003 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17a (1952). The Com-
modity Exchange Act was originally called the Grain Futures Act. The commodities
initially regulated were wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, flax, and sorghum. The Grain
Futures Act vas amended in 1936 to include cotton, rice, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Irish
potatoes. 49 STAT. 1491 (1936). The 1936 amendment also increased the protection
of the public from unscrupulous brokers and traders. 49 STAT. 1495, 100 (1936).
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broadening the Commodity Exchange Act " to include all commodities in
which futures trading is conducted.17 The theory of regulation under the Act
is preventive rather than remedial. Before futures trading can be conducted
on a regulated exchange, its entire operation is reviewed by the Commodity
Exchange Commission.68  New contracts, regulations, and by-laws are sub-
ject to scrutiny by the Commission. 69 Brokers are required to register with
the Commission before they can trade in futures. 70 Reports of trading activity
must be filed with the Commission 71 and are used to determine whether
limits should be placed on speculative trading.72 The Commission can suspend
trading or traders upon any violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.U
Congress has added to the list of regulated commodities piecemeal, 74 fre-
quently goaded by public outcry against the irregularities of futures trading
in a particular commodity.75 Such patchwork amending has left a handful of
commodities in which futures trading enjoys unwarranted license from pre-
ventive regulation. Extension of the Act to all futures trading seems to offer
the best protection available for both the general public and the trader.
67. For a list of the commodities in which substantial futures trading is done which
are not included under the Commodity Exchange Act, see note 25 supra.
68. 42 STAT. 1000 (1923), 7 U.S.C. § 8 (1952).
69. 49 STAT. 1497 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § 7a (1952).
70. Id. at 1495, 7 U.S.C. § 6f (1952).
71. 42 STAT. 1000 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 8 (1952).
72. 49 STAT. 1492 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1952). This power has been exercised on
several occasions. See Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 843-44 (1951).
73. 49 STAT. 1496 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § 6g (1952) (trading); 42 STAT. 1001 (1922),
as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 7b (1952) (traders).
74. Wool tops were added to the list of regulated commodities in 1938. 52 STAT. 205
(1938). Fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil and
all other fats and oils), cotton seed meal, cotton seed, peanuts, soybeans, and soy beun
meal were added in 1940. 54 STAT. 1059 (1940). Wool was added in 1954. Pub, L. No.
690, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 710 (Aug. 28, 1954).
75. The irregularities in cotton and grain trading during the early 1930's resulted in
public pressure on Congress to amend the Grain Futures Act. 42 STAT. 998-1003, as
amended, 7 U.S.C. 1-17a (1952). See Hearing before Crnnnittec on Agriculture and
Forestry on H.R. 6772, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 155-288 (1936); 80 CoNG. REc. 7051, 7710,
7845, 7857, 7905, 7907, 7916, 7918, 8010, 8288 (1936). The public reaction to the! irregu-
larities on the Coffee Exchange is being felt in Congress. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec.
12, 1954, § 3, p. 1, col. 7.
Extension of the Commodity Exchange Act to all commodities which are traded on
futures exchanges might be an imperfect solution. The Secretary of Agriculture is re-
quired by the Act to issue reports on supply and demand for the regulated commodities,
42 STAT. 1003 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 12 (1952). It might be difficult to provide
accurate crop reports for imported commodities. FTC REPORT xxiv-xxv. The Commodity
Exchange Authority is aware of this problem. See letter from Rodger R. Kauffman,
Commodity Exchange Authority, to Yale Law Journal, dated Jan. 3, 1955, on file in Yale
Law Library. However, many of the commodities in which trading is regulated, such
as wool and wool tops, are also primarily imported. The Commodity Exchange Authority
has long recommended the extension of regulation to all futures trading of agricultural
products. See REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COMxMODITY EXCHANGE AUTHORITY
9-10 (1949). Difficulty in providing the auxiliary service of crop reporting should not
preclude regulation of manipulation.
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